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ANGUS MACKENZIE 
 
‘Public-spirited men’: Economic Unionist Nationalism in Inter-War 
Scotland1  
 
ABSTRACT 
The prolonged economic slump which overshadowed much of the inter-war period 
encouraged a small number of Clydeside industrialists to intervene with bold plans to 
restructure and revive the Scottish economy.  Key figures like Sir James Lithgow and Lord Weir 
exploited their business, banking and political connections, in Scotland and in London, to 
produce a uniquely Scottish response to the inter-war crisis.  Championing the existing Union 
and imperial relationships, they nevertheless articulated a new sense of Scottish 
exceptionalism.  Convinced that any revival in trade was dependent on rationalisation of the 
heavy industries and an ambitious programme of diversification, Lithgow, Weir and their 
associates promoted distinctive Scottish solutions.  Building on the work of Graeme Morton, 
the article suggests that what emerged was an economic Unionist Nationalism which built 
alliances between business and civic Scotland to secure Scottish interests while 
acknowledging the primacy of Union.  The mechanism used to achieve their aims was based 
upon the associational culture of Scottish business, ‘self-help’ voluntary bodies which 
carefully steered an independent path, avoiding, where possible, direct state involvement.  
Yet the depth and persistence of the global depression, and the urgency of the task at hand 
in Scotland itself, encouraged the business community to moderate its hostility to 
interventionism and economic planning and engage with new partners.  The founding of the 
Scottish National Development Council in the early 1930s, bringing business and civil society 
together to help foster economic revival, was a crucial staging post on the journey towards 
corporatism.  Motivated by a mix of public-spiritedness and self-interest, there was, however, 
a strong defensive element to their actions as the essentially conservative industrialists 
sought to ward off social, political and economic threats from within Scotland.    Their 
willingness to step forward suggests a traditional sense of patrician responsibility, but there 
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was also an acute awareness of the need to adapt, a progressive quality missing from other 
actors. 
 
 
 
The inter-war trade depression has been well-recorded, but less attention has been given to 
the response of Scottish business.2 The Great War left the staple trades exhausted and 
indebted, but Scotland was slow to adapt to the new, consumer-focused industries which 
thrived in southern England.3 George Malcolm Thomson, the journalist and nationalist, 
captured the national mood when he observed that ‘there is a five word phrase which brings 
terror to the hearts of all Scottish people: The Southward Drift of Industry’.4 The resulting 
gloom influenced writers, intellectuals and politicians and encouraged a brief flowering of 
Home Rule activity.5 Yet there was also movement from within the business community. From 
the mid-1920s until the outbreak of the Second World War, a new generation of West of 
Scotland industrialists intervened to advance a business-orientated alternative to state 
intervention or managed decline. Building on Victorian ideas of self-help and voicing a 
determinedly optimistic view of economic revival, this small group of respected business 
figures worked to restructure Scottish industry while restoring self-confidence. Crucially, 
these industrialists—Unionists to a man—were explicit in articulating the need for 
distinctively Scottish solutions. 
 
This article considers the economic Unionist Nationalism which emerged during the inter-war 
years. Specifically, it addresses the behaviour of those West of Scotland figures—Sir James 
Lithgow, Lord Weir and Sir Steven Bilsland—who used the security of inherited wealth and 
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their connections within and beyond the business community to advance their vision of 
Scotland’s economic future. James Lithgow (1883–1952) and William Weir (1877–1959) were 
the pre-eminent Scottish industrialists of their generation. Lithgow built his reputation as a 
shipbuilder, Weir in engineering.6 Both men had inherited successful businesses, and in each 
case there was a trusted family member (Lithgow’s younger brother Henry, Weir’s half-
brother John Richmond) whose day-to-day management allowed the elder sibling to develop 
interests beyond their respective industries.7 In contrast, Steven Bilsland (1892–1970) had a 
lower profile.8 He forged a career in banking and insurance, but he was also an active member 
of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and a leading figure in the Chamber’s attempts to revive 
the West of Scotland economy. All three advocated radical surgery for the failing heavy 
industries and rapid diversification to introduce new industries to Scotland, and throughout 
the 1930s they championed initiatives which sought to transform the country’s fortunes.  
 
For much of the inter-war period, attempts to restore economic stability were predicated on 
two strategies: rationalisation and diversification. Sir James Lithgow and Lord Weir were 
amongst the first to recognise that however the recovery manifested itself, the heavy 
industries would not regain their pre-eminence. At a practical level, rationalisation served as 
a means of addressing over-capacity, but it also provided an opportunity for Scottish 
industrialists to preserve their own interests. The benefits for individual firms in reducing 
wasteful duplication were clear, but the case for rationalisation in Scotland assumed national 
significance, extending far beyond the industries in question. Writing in 1932, Lord Weir 
warned that the ‘entire future industrial prosperity of the West of Scotland depends on the 
recreation of a healthy steel industry’, but what he was advocating was far from Clydeside 
nationalism, it was an appreciation of a deeper Scottish interest.9 In promoting remedial 
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action, Lithgow, Weir et al were stressing Scottish exceptionalism while continuing to support 
Union and Imperial relationships. Indeed, such was the strength of their commitment to 
unionism, and the lengths they went to reimagine it in a more troubled period, that it calls 
into question Colin Kidd’s use of the term ‘banal unionism’.10 Kidd rightly notes the 
porousness between unionism and nationalism in the early twentieth century, but the 
suggestion that, for most Scots, the Union remained ‘uncontentious and invisible’, underplays 
the disparate threats which came together so forcibly in the 1920s.11 Inter-war unionism, at 
least from an economic perspective, was far from banal. For the industrialists contemplating 
the repercussions of the post-war slump, there were many reasons to be alarmed, and the 
sudden turnaround in Scottish economic prospects was compounded by the political fallout 
from Red Clydeside and a small, but vocal, Home Rule movement. Building on Graeme 
Morton’s work on mid-nineteenth century Unionist Nationalism, it will be suggested that the 
sustained period of uncertainty after the Great War compelled forward-thinking members of 
Scotland’s business community to rethink economic development in purely Scottish terms.12  
 
 8 m8i imii 8miThe economic Unionist Nationalism which emerged shares many of the 
characteristics identified by Morton, but the scale of the dislocation created new urgency. To 
address shortcomings exposed by the post-war slump, Scottish industrialists built alliances 
across civil society, using the institutions and associational culture of civic Scotland and the 
commercial realm. Attempts to rebalance an economy which had grown too dependent on 
heavy industry relied upon voluntary organisations which remained distinct from the state. 
By operating at one remove from the state, their interventions mediated through their 
stewardship of the principal industrial institutions—Chambers of Commerce, inter-locking 
directorships and employers’ associations—Scottish business sought to defend the existing 
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Union and imperial relationships. Morton’s observation that the committees of nineteenth-
century urban Scotland provided ‘the very machinery necessary to deal with almost any 
social, economic or political issue in the city and without recourse to the parliamentary state’, 
could equally be applied to the interventionism of inter-war development bodies.13  
 
Yet whereas Morton offers a compelling examination of the urban ‘state within a state’ in the 
mid-nineteenth century, industrial Scotland, in the throes of the inter-war depression, 
presents an additional economic dimension. Reviving old industries and diversifying into new 
areas required the broadest of coalitions, new entities which extended well beyond the 
traditional business milieu. The creation of the Scottish National Development Council (SNDC) 
represented such change. With its voluntary structure and web of sub-committees, the SNDC 
had its genesis in the Victorian civil society described by Morton, but the national vision and 
the economic intent suggests something more significant.14 With strong support from local 
government and individual Chambers of Commerce, the SNDC provided a new outlet for a 
civic nationalism that was rooted in some of Scotland’s oldest institutions. It appears apt that 
the launch of the Development Council took place at a meeting of the Convention of Royal 
Burghs, a body with a long pedigree which had been central to the setting up of the modern 
Scottish Office in 1885.15 Lithgow explained that the Development Council’s main task was ‘to 
inspire Scotsmen with a renewed belief in themselves and in their country’ and considered its 
role to be one of ‘stimulating psychological influence’ and restoring self-confidence.16 
Overcoming the sense of national malaise—which became more pronounced as the 
depression began to bite—was one of the Development Council’s central aims, and initiatives 
like the opening of an information bureau in London, the magazine Scotland and the 1938 
Empire Exhibition need to be viewed through this prism.  
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By the late 1930s, a more active body—the Scottish Economic Committee (SEC)—had 
emerged. This example of Marwick’s consensual ‘middle opinion’, placed in a Scottish context 
by Lindsay Paterson, mirrored the growing autonomy of the Scottish Office as more functions 
transferred north from Whitehall.17 Paterson’s observation that ‘the Scottish Office led the 
way in promoting the notion of a Scottish national interest’ was as accurate in the late 1930s 
as it was in the 1960s.18 The growth of economic planning and statist ideas reflected 
continued uncertainty, but it also signalled the once-independent Scottish industrialists’ 
acceptance of collaboration and consensus. Crucially, it was clear that the solutions for 
Scotland’s economic ills were now to be sought within Scotland itself. Economic Unionist 
Nationalism in the 1930s relied upon a coalition of interested parties from across Scottish civil 
society, but it was the business community which provided direction. The parochialism 
apparent in Morton’s description of mid-nineteenth century Scotland was replaced by a more 
determined national vision. Yet it was still rooted firmly in the Union relationship, albeit one 
now evolving in response to the economic concerns of Scotland’s industrial elite. 
 
**** 
 
The first tangible sign of economic Unionist Nationalism—the reshaping of the steel and 
shipbuilding industries—was a direct response to the collapse in trade after 1920. Over the 
following two decades, industrialists like Sir James Lithgow intervened to defend and secure 
Scottish interests. Julian Greaves has suggested that by the late 1920s, rationalisation had 
become ‘common currency’ within much of British industry, but in Scotland its application 
was uneven at best.19 R. H. Campbell has noted how the outlook of Scottish industrialists had 
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been moulded by the cycles of boom and bust of the pre-war period, leaving them wholly 
unprepared for the depth and persistence of the post-war crisis, preferring instead to ‘wait 
and see’.20 When the conflict begun in 1914 it offered temporary relief, but signs that British 
economic hegemony was in retreat, apparent before the war, intensified. During the Great 
War, Weir and Lithgow were part of a cadre of talented figures from business who were 
recruited to government in response to a perceived dearth of talent in the civil service. 
Although born out of necessity, the introduction of businessmen into the supply of munitions 
and shipping unwittingly created a network of shipbuilders, engineers and assorted industrial 
experts who would later work together in Scotland throughout the downturn. Their exposure 
to heightened state control was an important stepping stone on route to the corporatist ideas 
of the late 1930s, yet the experience of war itself served to underscore the continuing 
strength of the Union.  
 
For the generation of industrialists who led businesses in the immediate pre-war period and 
came to prominence during the war, there was obviously a strong element of self-interest 
and defensiveness about their need to preserve their individual industries. Lithgow had much 
to gain from any revival, and although his involvement in the rationalisation process carried 
short-term risk, a slimmed-down industry was always going to generate greater returns for 
the survivors-—especially once rearmament was confirmed.21 Any meditation on the actions 
of Lithgow and Weir should be tempered with the knowledge that their personal interests 
were intertwined with the fortunes of the wider Scottish economy. Yet this in itself cannot 
explain the effort expended in securing the future of the Scottish industry. Over the course of 
more than  
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a decade, from the mid-1920s until the outbreak of the Second World War, Lord Weir and Sir 
James Lithgow intervened repeatedly to reduce the productive capacity of both steel and 
shipbuilding so that the remaining units might prosper. Using contacts in banking, threats, 
persuasion, or simply, ‘the depth of the Lithgow family’s purse’, rationalisation was just one 
strand of a broader Unionist Nationalism.22  
 
The rationalisation movement in Scotland was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of the giant 
Beardmore business.23 More than any other firm, William Beardmore & Co. Ltd symbolised 
Scotland’s industrial contribution to the war effort and the disastrous effects of the 
aftermath. Over-stretched and indebted, Beardmore slid into a steep decline, unable to 
recover from the sudden termination of armaments contracts and the reduction in naval 
shipbuilding.24 Beardmore’s problems were symptomatic of an industry-wide problem and 
served as a metaphor for decline in Scotland itself. In a wave of post-war optimism, many of 
the principal shipbuilders had bought majority holdings in steel firms to ensure continuity of 
supply, but this vertical integration occurred as the market collapsed leaving many saddled 
with ruinous debts. The very real prospect of the Beardmore business entering liquidation 
concentrated minds in the business and financial communities, the Bank of England looking 
to protect its own and the clearing banks’ liabilities.25 In many respects, Lithgow and Weir 
were fortunate that the concerns of the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, 
about the implications of a Beardmore collapse coincided with their desire to reshape the 
industry. Norman’s determination to extricate the Bank from damaging loans gave the 
industrialists considerable freedom. Lord Weir—respected within industry and trusted by 
government—was an obvious go-between and in tandem with the Ayrshire-born industrial 
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administrator Sir Andrew Duncan, he acted as a conduit between the Bank of England and 
Scottish industry.26  
 
The unique degree of access to the Governor of the Bank of England that Weir and Lithgow 
were able to achieve gave them considerable authority when it came to leaning on the more 
reluctant participants in the process, helping to ensure that once rationalisation was 
underway, it became an unstoppable force. Although the support of the Bank of England 
undoubtedly removed many obstacles, government involvement was minimal. With the 
Beardmore debacle casting a long shadow, the Bank of England was doubtless relieved that 
there were individuals prepared to assist and, more importantly, offer a workable alternative 
to outright nationalisation, particularly after the election of a Labour government in 1929. But 
there was also a remarkable degree of trust in Lithgow and Weir’s abilities. Writing to the 
Governor of the Bank of England in 1929, Sir Andrew Duncan clearly believed that having 
Lithgow involved in restructuring the shipbuilding industry represented something of a coup:  
 
We are also impressed with the fact that a reliable and competent man like Sir James 
Lithgow, has agreed to become active in the matter … Needless to say, the greatest 
latitude would have to be given to Sir James Lithgow, and we feel very sure that trust 
in him would not be misplaced.27 
 
With their extensive connections in business, banking and politics, in Scotland and in London, 
Weir and Lithgow were perhaps the only Scottish industrial figures during the period with the 
confidence and ability to step forward. They used their standing to pull together the disparate 
factions within industries. The ‘highly individualistic and independent shipbuilders who 
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maneuvered themselves uneasily into hesitant co-operation’ were brought together largely 
because of fear over the consequences of inaction.28 The first sign that meaningful change 
might be possible was a meeting of Scottish steel owners at the Glasgow home of Lord Weir 
in February 1929 to discuss a possible series of mergers designed to rationalise capacity in the 
industry within Scotland. Weir was adamant that he was working independently and for the 
good of Scotland, telling the meeting that he was, 
 
Gravely concerned at the depressed conditions of industry in South Scotland as 
compared with the prosperity of Southern England … you have it in your power 
through this metallurgical development to completely rejuvenate both the 
industries and the spirit in the West of Scotland.29  
 
The subsequent Brassert Report, recommending a new integrated plant at a deep-water 
location at Erskine on the River Clyde included too many risks for individual owners, but it 
opened a dialogue between the main producers which, given the strong personalities and the 
animosities which had existed between them, was significant in itself.30  
 
Steel rationalisation dragged on into the 1930s and became increasingly dependent on Sir 
James Lithgow flexing his financial muscle. The Lithgow brothers’ ownership of the mining 
and steel firm James Dunlop & Co. had allowed them to participate in the Brassert talks in 
1929 and their audacious approach to John Craig, chairman of Scotland’s largest iron and steel 
producer, David Colville & Sons Ltd, proposing that their firms should merge, placed them 
centre-stage. Craig recognised the purchasing power of the Lithgow shipyards and was keen 
to cement the relationship and the deal. Colvilles Ltd, formed in January 1931, was 
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subsequently welcomed as being ‘a rationalisation move of first class importance to 
Scotland’.31 Recognition that the survival of the heavy industries depended on collective 
action on the part of the Scottish producers and that merger offered the most practical route 
towards some form of prosperity, created a momentum which eventually overcame the 
extensive personal differences between individual owners. The idea of an industry-based 
solution was appealing. In 1931, the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation wrote that ‘the 
shipbuilding industry has always been opposed to state aid or interference of any kind’.32 
While this was more than a little disingenuous, the shipbuilders feared nationalisation and 
the industry’s own scheme was a defensive measure to protect its own interests—a 
demonstration that they could put their own house in order.33  
 
James and Henry Lithgow joined the board of the newly-created Colvilles Ltd. The following 
year, because of Bank of England pressure, Sir James joined the board of Beardmore, ensuring 
that the remaining parts of the company could be included in his vision of a slimmer, more 
specialised industry. Lithgow was blunt in his assessment of the weaker parts of the Scottish 
industry, telling Sir Andrew Duncan that ‘we are going to have a hard enough job in the 
Scottish steel trade to keep the living in life without trying to do the impossible with 
resurrecting the dead’.34 Negotiations between owners remained painfully slow and 
Lithgow’s solution to the impasse was to act independently of Colvilles and use his own 
private wealth to buy a controlling stake in the most significant of the remaining independent 
firms, the Steel Company of Scotland (SCS). Lithgow paid £672,975 for SCS in 1935, 
complaining that ‘I have a feeling that the sellers are taking advantage to an undue extent of 
the known desire on my part not only to strengthen Colville’s position, but to take action in 
the national interest’.35 The purchase of SCS demonstrated Lithgow’s ability to make the 
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grand gesture, and immediately upon taking control, he offered his shares to the Colvilles 
board, suggesting that he was willing to make a sale without taking a profit.36 By 1936, with 
rearmament orders bringing stability and profitability, Colvilles Ltd was the monopoly 
producer of finished steel products in Scotland. The culmination of this prolonged series of 
mergers and amalgamations represented a considerable personal triumph for Lithgow, but it 
also represented a clear signal that Scottish business could and would move decisively to 
defend its interests. 
 
Inter-war economic Unionist Nationalism highlighted the industrialists’ strengths and 
weaknesses. As the most talented Scottish business figures of their generation, it was 
inevitable that Lithgow and Weir’s ideas would carry weight, and their extended circle offered 
the means to act on them. Yet there was also a defensiveness, due in part to potential threat 
posed by the rise of the Labour Party in Scotland, and it is notable that the social and political 
repercussions of a complete closure of the Beardmore business were deemed unpalatable. 
Frank Hodges, an ex-trade unionist turned Bank of England advisor, admitted in 1931 that aid 
had been given ‘to meet a temporary social situation which would have arisen in Glasgow if 
the Works had been stopped’.37 To some extent, Scottish business was caught unprepared by 
social and political events to which they were either violently opposed, or simply did not 
understand. The recent history of industrial militancy in Clydeside was fresh in the memory, 
and in 1935 Sir Steven Bilsland, president of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, could still tell 
an audience that the ‘extreme political thought emanating from this area has damaged our 
reputation, and may have frightened promoters of new industries’.38  
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Weir and Lithgow’s mistrust of socialism reflected ingrained prejudice, but their economic 
interventions from the mid-1920s onwards gain significance because of their willingness to 
move beyond the narrow parameters set by previous generations of business figures. The 
growing recognition that the survival of the heavy industries depended on collective action 
on the part of the Scottish producers and that merger—and, it was presumed, 
rationalisation—offered the most practical route towards some form of prosperity, created 
momentum. The belief that Scottish industry could unite as a distinct entity, in the face of 
various external threats, suggests a degree of nationalism within the parameters of the UK 
economy which prioritised the preservation of the existing industrial framework. Against this 
volatile backdrop, Scottish business was forced to address two sides of the same problem: 
their instinctive desire to resist the menace of socialism, and a growing sense that the pace 
of change—social, economic and political—was rapidly moving beyond their control. Their 
response, demonstrated repeatedly over the course of the inter-war period, was to seek to 
intervene on their own terms.  
 
**** 
 
Beyond the machinations that surrounded rationalisation, industrialists were keen to stress 
the need for diversification. Writing in 1932, Hugh Cree, president of Glasgow Chamber of 
Commerce, voiced a common concern when he noted laconically that ‘we would have been 
better to have had our eggs in a larger number of baskets’.39 If rationalisation was mired in 
gloomy talk of surgery and amputation, moves to diversify formed part of a more optimistic 
story of national renewal. Events as diverse as the creation of the Scottish National 
Development Council (SNDC), church union and the beginnings of administrative devolution 
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engendered a more positive outlook, but it was the Development Council which provided the 
most striking economic manifestation of Unionist Nationalism. The successes of the SNDC 
during the 1930s were limited—rearmament skewed economic progress and diversification 
was hesitant at best— but the more active and consensual approach adopted by the business 
community was central to embedding corporatism. Viewed in conjunction with reform in the 
Scottish Office, the SNDC and its offspring, the SEC, represented a significant break with the 
past. Weir and Lithgow’s Unionist Nationalism was defined by their determination that revival 
should be built from within Scotland itself, and the new bodies which emerged in the 1930s 
created the mechanism for successive interventions well into the post-war period.  
 
At the April 1931 meeting of the Convention of Royal Burghs, Sir Henry Keith, a venerable 
figure in Unionist circles, moved the motion to create the SNDC.40 He highlighted the inclusive 
nature of the new organisation and suggested that the new body would welcome ‘any 
Chambers of Commerce, or any bodies of employers or workmen, or others desirous of 
Scottish national development in any direction calculated to increase employment, and to 
advance and widen the economic interests of the people’.41 The new body attracted attention 
from a host of Scottish worthies, but amongst the most active members were a number with 
nationalist sympathies: Sir Henry Keith and Sir Alexander MacEwen were instrumental in 
forming the moderate Scottish Party in the autumn of 1932.42 Yet there was little conflict 
between the overwhelmingly Unionist representatives of business and the more mixed 
membership drawn from across civic Scotland.  
 
With Sir James Lithgow confirmed as chairman, the work of the SNDC started in the autumn 
of 1931. Edward Bruce, earl of Elgin and Kincardine, a landowner, director of the Royal Bank 
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of Scotland, and chairman of Fife County Council, was elected president.43 Elgin was a 
tenacious supporter of efforts to diversify and in his acceptance speech, he stressed that 
through the Development Council, industrial Scotland would finally have a voice.44 As the 
most high-profile industrialist, it was, however, Lithgow who became the public face and the 
most energetic champion of the SNDC. From the outset, the Development Council stressed 
its independence, and both Lithgow and Elgin welcomed the participation of trade union 
representatives. Lithgow was an unfailingly enthusiastic advocate and during the difficult first 
year, when the new organisation could point to few, if any, concrete achievements, it was 
Lithgow, through a series of speeches and articles, who kept the SNDC in the limelight. 
Considering the other demands on his time, Lithgow’s commitment to the SNDC was the 
clearest indication of his concern for the general economic development of industrial 
Scotland. 
 
The tactics adopted in these early days owed much to the network of local development 
boards which had emerged across Scotland in the late 1920s. These initiatives were 
developed by individual Chambers of Commerce or town or county councils in response to 
sudden increases in unemployment. During the first two years of the SNDC, local 
organisations continued to operate in parallel with the national body, with individual Boards 
preferring to remain independent. This expression of civic nationalism reflected suspicion of 
the centralisation of efforts to promote diversification—the Edinburgh Development 
Committee, in particular, feared a west coast bias within the SNDC—but support for the SNDC 
amongst senior figures in local government helped to ease some of the local rivalries and 
perceived slights.45 Local development boards not only provided the blueprint, in terms of 
aims, for the SNDC, they started to experiment with publicity and marketing, selling the merits 
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of investing in their particular locale. The Edinburgh Development Committee published a 
striking pamphlet, Place Your Factory in Edinburgh, which advised prospective employers 
that, ‘generally speaking, Edinburgh workpeople are of a superior type and, on the average, 
of a high standard of education, intelligent, and adaptable to new methods and modern 
development’.46 In the west of Scotland, the Development Board for Glasgow and District, 
formed in 1930, promoted the advantages of locating in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley.47 Town 
or County Councils in Falkirk, Airdrie, Ardrossan, Kilmarnock, Dunbartonshire and West 
Lothian all formed their own committees.48 Even Campbeltown, coming to terms with the 
closure of local mines, established its own Board.49 In each case, the priority was 
diversification. The development boards recall Morton’s suggestion that through 
participation in governance at the local level and engagement with a wide variety of activities, 
‘good and worthy’ men would take control of their own affairs, working in cooperation with 
central government.50 
 
Yet despite the Development Council attracting talented personnel, progress was slow. In a 
letter to Weir, discussing the relative effectiveness of the Liverpool Development Board, 
Lithgow wrote that ‘such a council, well run, might be of inestimable value to Scotland. 
Unfortunately, up to date it [the SNDC] has not cut any ice because its construction has been 
a trifle haphazard’.51 Lithgow recognised, however, that ‘a much more forceful way of 
awakening interest in Scottish industry [was] to make the nation-wide appeal’.52 The Scottish 
Trades Union Congress (STUC) agreed. At their April 1931 conference, just days after the 
Convention of Royal Burghs debate, the STUC president, C. N. Gallie, suggested that ‘a 
National Development Board which would view the problem as a whole is imperative’.53 The 
participation of the trade union umbrella organisation in the SNDC was controversial, with 
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individual members recoiling from cooperation with a business leadership they still viewed 
with hostility.54 The irony that those industrialists who had been vilified for rationalisation 
and the resultant unemployment were now in charge of the recovery was not lost on many 
trade unionists, with a delegate to the 1937 STUC conference expressing incredulity that ‘the 
captains of the wreckers are the coxswains of the life-boat crews’.55 The long-serving STUC 
secretary, William Elger, was nevertheless open to trade union involvement with the 
Development Council, and in tandem with the slightly less confrontational approach of 
Scottish business in the 1930s, helped to settle some of the lingering tensions from the Red 
Clydeside period.56  
 
The first serious indication of government involvement in industrial development came with 
the appointment of Sir Arthur Rose, an Edinburgh businessman, as Special Areas 
Commissioner for Scotland in 1934. A director of both the Glasgow-based Union Bank of 
Scotland and the LMS railway, Rose was, unsurprisingly, part of Lithgow and Bilsland’s 
extended network of contacts.57 R. H. Campbell has commented on the hesitancy and lack of 
ambition in the Special Areas project as conceived in 1934 and this was only partly addressed 
by additional powers granted in 1937.58 John Gibson has described how the 1934 legislation 
was drafted by the Treasury with the primary aim of limiting expenditure, suggesting that in 
their first few years, the Commissioner was timid and ‘cautious to the point of triviality’.59 
Bizarrely, in his first few years the Commissioner was constrained from investing in industrial 
development; his early work, outside of planning and research, consisted of public works 
including drainage and sewerage.60 It was only with the Special Areas Reconstruction 
(Amendment) Act in 1937, overseen by Rose’s successor, Sir David Allen Hay, that direct 
financial aid for industrial development was channelled through the offices of the 
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Commissioner. As far as the SNDC was concerned, the appointment of the Special Areas 
Commissioner brought two distinct benefits. Firstly, it represented an acknowledgement on 
the part of government of the seriousness of the problem. More importantly, the 
Commissioner had funds and the limited resources that could be pushed towards the SNDC 
were gratefully received. Nevertheless, the initial bar on the Commissioner investing in new 
industries caused frustration, with nationalists becoming increasingly vocal. The Scots 
Independent complained that, ‘development plans without finance are like an engine without 
power’.61 Yet while the resources were feeble, the designation of a specific Scottish 
Commissioner was in itself recognition of the unique difficulties facing Scotland and the 
urgency of finding bespoke solutions. 
 
In early 1936, continuing disquiet within both the business community and the Scottish Office 
about the slow pace of recovery led to the establishment of the Scottish Economic Committee 
(SEC). The idea of an Economic Committee was first suggested by Rose in his First Report 
(1935).62 He had struggled to make any real impact since his appointment, and was keen to 
see the SNDC adopt a more active role. He was inspired and encouraged by Dr James Bowie, 
director of Dundee School of Economics and Commerce, who had called for ‘extensive 
scientific efforts’ to accelerate economic revival, citing the inadequacy of the existing work of 
the Commissioner and the SNDC.63 Despite being set up as a sub-committee of the SNDC, the 
co-operation and increased financial support of the Scottish Office and the Commissioner for 
Special Areas ensured that the SEC assumed a quasi-official status, blurring the lines between 
business and the state.  
 
 
 
 19 
The idea that the SEC, like the SNDC, was independent of government was reaffirmed by the 
secretary of state for Scotland (1932-1936), Sir Godfrey Collins.64 Launching the SEC, he told 
his audience of businessmen that ‘your Committee is not a Committee imposed on industry 
by the Government. It is a Committee created by industry itself, with whose objects His 
Majesty’s Government is in the most complete sympathy’.65 The Glasgow Herald welcomed 
signs of ‘a revival in the old Scottish spirit of self-help’, noting that that the SEC signalled a 
move from ‘the necessary task of survey to brisk and aggressive action’.66 In a similar vein, 
the Clydesdale Bank’s annual economic survey in 1937 welcomed the ‘closer and increasingly 
fruitful co-operation of public effort and private enterprise’.67 The effusive welcome for the 
SEC from such traditionally conservative voices suggested that the corporatist ideas inherent 
in economic Unionist Nationalism had started to enter the mainstream of Scottish business 
opinion by the late 1930s. The recognition that intervention and cooperation represented 
potential opportunities was in part a reflection of the importance attached to rearmament 
orders, but there was also wider cultural shift within business towards accepting a greater 
role for the state. 
 
The growing consensus between business and the Scottish Office created a tension with the 
Treasury which became apparent within days of the SEC announcement. The chancellor of 
the exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, claimed that any new body [the SEC] which supplanted 
the Special Areas Board would be tantamount to an admission of government failure.68 
Chamberlain felt that rearmament alone would provide the necessary stimulus for 
Lanarkshire and the Clyde, with smaller suppliers benefitting from a trickle-down effect. The 
failure of the Treasury to show any real understanding of the nuances of the Scottish 
economy, and its gradual loss of interest in the Special Areas, can be explained in part by its 
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belief that economic conditions nationally were improving.69 The reality in Scotland was 
somewhat different, but the support of Scottish Office ministers and the growing civil service 
establishment in Edinburgh ensured that the Economic Committee was integrated into the 
Scottish economic and political nexus.70 The suggestion of a schism, however minor, between 
London and Edinburgh was indicative, on the Scottish side, of an appreciation that even after 
administrative reform in the Scottish Office, the ingrained nature of the country’s economic 
problems demanded a specific Scottish response. 
 
In comparison with the SNDC, the SEC was a more purposeful outfit, reflecting an economic 
environment dominated by rearmament and the shadow of war. In contrast to the 
Development Council’s diverse membership, the SEC membership was drawn primarily from 
the banks and industry. Heavy industry was particularly well represented—there were three 
directors of Colvilles on the SEC—and the Committee as a whole, despite the presence of 
three trade union members, demonstrated the extensive reach of the main industrialists. The 
SEC embraced interventionism and planning, actively seeking to emulate the successful 
trading estates of the south while lobbying hard to gain a larger share of rearmament orders 
for Scottish firms. Some of the most explicitly interventionist ideas advanced by the SEC came 
to fruition during this period. Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd was formed in 1936 to bring the 
idea of the purpose-built trading estate, as seen in Trafford Park or Slough, to Scotland. The 
following year, the SEC formed a limited company, The Scottish Development Financial Trust 
Ltd to provide capital for new industries locating anywhere in Scotland, not just within the 
Special Areas. Sir Steven Bilsland was the leading figure in both schemes, bringing experience 
from both Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and the Scottish clearing banks. The thinking 
behind these projects, the sense that ‘something should be done’ and the suggestion that 
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these were the people to take responsibility for Scotland’s future, is apparent in the 
comments surrounding the creation of the Trust in 1938: 
 
This problem should not be left ‘in the air’; it is known that many people regard it 
as a matter of conscience—that something requires to be done and can be done, 
to infuse new life into Scottish industry, and that public-spirited men cannot stand 
by and do nothing.71 
 
Growing signs of Scottish Office independence from Whitehall in the 1930s suggested a new 
confidence that these issues could be best addressed within Scotland itself.72 The business 
community—and Lithgow in particular—associated themselves with the increased powers of 
administrative devolution, but there was also a pragmatic desire to choke off any further 
demands for Home Rule. Yet there was a more considered belief that by transferring a degree 
of economic oversight to Scotland, albeit in a manner of their choosing, they could continue 
their work in reshaping the economy, reviving traditional industries while actively seeking to 
diversify. This acknowledgement of Scottish exceptionalism coincided with the increasing 
autonomy of the Scottish Office machine, creating a degree of independence from Whitehall 
which helped underpin economic Unionist Nationalism. 
 
Walter Elliot, who succeeded Collins as secretary of state for Scotland in November 1936, 
continued to make the case for a distinctly Scottish approach to economic revival.73 Elliot was 
a key moderniser, moderate, consensual and open to an increased role for the state.74 Paul 
Ward’s observation that Elliot ‘saw the Union and Scottishness not only as reconcilable but as 
integral to each other’ captures the Unionists election-winning appeal to Scottish sensibilities, 
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but could also easily be applied to the thinking of inter-war industrialists like Lithgow, Weir 
and Bilsland.75 Elliot was secretary of state when the SEC addressed rearmament. The surge 
in rearmament orders was a mixed blessing for the Scottish economy. The orders which 
started to flow into the shipyards and steelworks of the West of Scotland as part of the 
defence programme after 1935 brought relative prosperity and, in many respects, vindicated 
many of the rationalisation measures. They also reaffirmed the Union relationship more 
forcibly than any other development in the inter-war period. But the SEC was torn. Stating 
that they did not wish to see recovery become dependent on government orders, the SEC 
went on to say that it would be ‘impossible … to disregard the value of a judicious allocation 
to Scottish firms’.76  
 
The SEC—with Elliot offering Cabinet support—lobbied for more rearmament orders to be 
directed to Scottish firms. An SEC delegation to Elliot pressed the case, stressing that it was 
‘as much a social as an economic problem’.77 But they were aware that the orders would be 
transitory. The SEC Annual Report in 1937 had described the upturn in heavy industry as being 
‘traceable to the artificial and it may be evanescent stimulus of the government’s rearmament 
programme’.78 The following year, Bilsland noted that these orders could ‘only be regarded 
as palliatives, pending the time when economic appeasement may, as all must desire, follow 
political appeasement’.79 Rearmament did however provide an immediate stimulus to the 
heavy industries—and it was no coincidence that Lithgow and Weir were privy to government 
plans to mobilise industry for war. Through their work as industrial advisers to the Committee 
of Imperial Defence, the two men had a unique insight into national armaments 
requirements, and amongst their recommendations was the creation of a network of shadow 
factories to continue production in the event of aerial attack.80 Lithgow in particular, as 
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chairman of both the Fairfield shipyard in Govan (1935) and William Beardmore & Co. Ltd 
(1936), was in the fortunate position of being both an advisor and the beneficiary of lucrative 
contracts which transformed the fortunes of the two firms. As Hugh Peebles notes, Lithgow 
would have been privy to information which was denied to his peers, but he was also alive to 
the economic benefits of the wider distribution of rearmament orders.81 The continuing focus 
on rearmament worried trade unionists and the Labour Party. The London Scots Self-
Government Committee, composed primarily of Scottish Labour MPs, suggested that ‘the 
industrialists are now playing their last desperate card—rearmament—in its terrible 
consequences the most reckless of all their misdeeds to Scotland’.82 Yet despite valid 
criticisms, the prospect of full order books was appealing, and Scottish business ended the 
decade believing that a corner had been turned. 
 
**** 
 
Inter-war Unionist Nationalism may have been defined by economic exigencies, but there was 
also a more profound debate about the future governance of Scotland. Scotland’s business 
leaders understood that the nation’s particular problems demanded a Scottish solution, but 
they were clear that these solutions came as part of the wider Union. Indeed, as the inter-war 
years progressed, there was a conscious effort to restate the value of Empire, linking 
Scotland’s long involvement with Imperial trade to the benefits of continuing union.83 While 
Alvin Jackson has noted that ‘Scottish national identity was consolidated amidst the carnage 
of War’, he goes on to emphasis that this identity was still located within the Union 
relationship—a bond which had been strengthened, not weakened, by the War.84 Yet despite 
this, uncertainty in the 1920s helped boost interest in Home Rule. Nationalism remained the 
 
 
 24 
concern of a very small, but dedicated, minority, but the founding of the National Party of 
Scotland (NPS) in 1928 and the Scottish Party in 1932 signalled a brief but nevertheless 
important upturn in Home Rule activity. The question of Scotland’s political future, the need 
for a separate parliament in Edinburgh, moved centre-stage. The business community was 
vociferous in its rejection of Home Rule, yet in coming to an accommodation which ultimately 
accepted a degree of administrative devolution, concessions were offered which helped 
sustain economic Unionist Nationalism. 
 
At a meeting convened by the ship-owner Lord Maclay in the Merchants House in Glasgow 
on 14 November 1932, a gathering of prominent West of Scotland business leaders met to 
form a committee to oppose Scottish self-government. The meeting followed an autumn 
where public interest in Home Rule had been stimulated by a circulation war between the 
Daily Record and recently launched Scottish Daily Express. The Express had gone as far as 
publishing some unscientific, but alarming, polling figures which, it was suggested, indicated 
a majority of Scots in support of Home Rule.85 The newspaper campaigns never translated 
into any meaningful electoral support, but they built upon general dissatisfaction with 
rationalisation, unemployment, emigration and the perception of a nation in decline. More 
importantly, the platform offered by the newspapers allowed moderate Home Rule ideas to 
prevail, a fact not lost on a business community which feared that the middle-classes might 
be tempted.  
 
The founding of the Scottish Party during the summer of 1932 transformed the business 
community’s attitude to Home Rule campaigners. With respectable leaders like the duke of 
Montrose and Sir Alexander MacEwen and support from well-connected Unionists, the 
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Scottish Party presented itself as the model of moderation.86 The party was essentially a 
grouping of those Home Rule supporters who felt unable to support the NPS policy of outright 
separation, preferring to campaign for self-government while stressing the primacy of Empire. 
They argued for a separate parliament in Edinburgh, suggesting that congestion at 
Westminster caused by imperial business, prevented Scottish affairs from receiving due 
attention, reviving ideas espoused by the Scottish Home Rule Association in the 1880s.87 The 
party had its roots in the Imperial Committee of Cathcart Unionist Association, and the leading 
figure in the Association, J. Kevan McDowell, a Glasgow solicitor and Burns aficionado, was 
an articulate advocate of self-government within an Imperialist framework.88 To date, 
Scotland’s industrialists had paid scant attention to the nationalist movement, but the 
emergence of a credible voice, backed by the opportunistic newspaper magnate Lord 
Beaverbrook, with his call to ‘remove the political deadwood’, galvanised the business 
community.89 
 
The subsequent meeting of several hundred leading figures from business, the professions 
and the landowning classes in mid-November 1932 was designed to halt moves towards 
Home Rule. Styling themselves as ‘representative of business and public opinion’ the list 
contained four dukes, two marquises, nine earls, three viscounts and seven lords.90 John 
McCormack wrote later that the assembly consisted of ‘400 of the leading reactionaries in 
Scotland’.91 From a West of Scotland perspective, there was impressive support from 
business. All of the principal industrialists were either present at the Merchants House or sent 
letters of support: Sir James Lithgow, Lord Weir, Sir Thomas Bell, Sir Alexander Kennedy, Sir 
John Cargill and John Craig all associated themselves with the cause.92 The past, present and 
future presidents of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce attended; the Chamber formally 
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expressing its disapproval of any form of self-government at a meeting ten days later.93 
Banking and insurance, manufacturing and the area’s main trade organisations were also well 
represented in a list which demonstrated the unity of Scottish commerce. The invitations 
called for a ‘spontaneous expression … so representative and striking’ that MPs would realise 
the folly of supporting any moves for self-government.94 However, the widespread support 
from the aristocracy and landowners, far from appearing representative, emphasised the 
extent to which the anti-Home Rule campaign appeared to be made up of vested interests. 
Describing the 400 signatories as the ‘Little Scotlanders’, the Scots Independent protested: 
‘they are of the same type as those who were on the famous Ragman’s Roll of six hundred 
years ago—men who were ready to sell and betray their country to England’.95 
 
The business community appeared rattled. At the preliminary meeting of the Anti-Scottish 
National Parliament Movement in late October 1932, Lord Maclay expressed the hope that in 
setting up a campaign, ‘Nationalist agitation would be nipped in the bud’.96 Reporting how 
the leaders of industry were, ‘coming together to set up resistance’, the Dundee Courier 
articulated another deep-rooted fear. It warned that, ‘Scotland is no longer thought of 
primarily as the land of mountain and flood, but as the land of the Maxtons, the Kirkwoods, 
the Buchanans and the McGoverns.’97 Despite Labour having been routed in the recent 
general election, there remained a strong antipathy to socialism. The very real possibility of a 
Labour majority in any future Scottish parliament and the associated dangers of higher taxes 
on income and profits exercised minds. Reflecting this, Maclay ignored the Home Rule 
movement’s most potent argument, that it was the ‘drift southwards’ of industry that 
presented the greatest danger, claiming instead that ‘the need was for ever closer relations 
between England and Scotland’.98 The Scots Independent picked up on Maclay’s argument, 
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complaining that ‘it is just that interlocking that has been so tragically detrimental to Scotland, 
although it may have been quite congenial to some of those at the meeting whose interests 
are similarly interlocked’.99 Maclay’s Unionist Nationalism was typical of the business 
community’s belief that whatever solutions were to be applied to Scotland’s problems, they 
should be rooted in the Union.  
 
Prior to the Glasgow meeting, the organisers prepared their ground well. Sir Godfrey Collins 
was briefed in advance by the Glasgow businessman Cecil Weir.100 Days before the Glasgow 
meeting, Weir told Collins that: 
 
The position briefly is that the Home Rulers of all sorts have been obtaining far 
too much publicity of late considering the far from representative character of 
both their leadership and following, and we felt it was high time that the political 
parties should be made aware that representative business and responsible public 
opinion in Scotland was not in favour of any form of devolution.101 
 
This viewpoint, that the nationalist line had been allowed to seep into the public 
consciousness almost unchallenged, was mirrored by the business community’s principal 
supporter, the Glasgow Herald. While certain that the Scottish people were unlikely to be 
taken in by nationalist propaganda, the newspaper argued that, ‘it was undoubtedly time for 
their claims to be vigorously refuted and for the real facts … to be authoritatively set forth’.102 
The organisers themselves were clearly confident. Cecil Weir wrote that he hoped that the 
meeting would, ‘have a shattering effect upon the various bodies of Scottish Nationalists and 
Home Rulers’.103 Michael Dyer’s suggestion of a ‘non-political common sense citizenry’, 
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essentially those on the centre-right of Scottish political life who the industrialists regarded 
as their natural constituency, is recalled in the repeated use of the term ‘representative 
opinion’.104 The innate self-confidence was clear in Cecil Weir’s comment on the eve of the 
Glasgow meeting that that ‘their authority to issue this statement is …. unchallengeable’.105 
  
Business opinion was implacably against Home Rule, but it became clear during the autumn 
of 1932 that there was a willingness amongst those opposed to Home Rule to concede some 
concrete changes in the administration of Scotland. In his letter to Sir Godfrey Collins before 
the Glasgow meeting, Cecil Weir had confided that ‘my personal opinion is the best way to 
dispose finally of the Home Rule agitators is to produce a positive policy, by means of which 
some adjustments might be made in the present machinery’.106 Speaking at the Merchants 
Hall, Sir James Lithgow admitted that he too was sympathetic towards reform. He believed 
that if this was addressed, it ‘would remove the only real ground upon which the present 
demands for a separate Parliament rested’.107 The concessions suggest a tactical decision to 
offer a degree of devolution which might appease moderate supporters. Moreover, given that 
the same group of industrialists was pushing their own agenda of economic revival through 
the SNDC, an effective civil service based in Edinburgh was perhaps an appealing prospect. 
  
When Home Rule was discussed in Parliament as part of the debate on the King’s Speech ten 
days after the anti-Home Rule meeting, it was clear that concessions would be offered. Sir 
Robert Horne, the former chancellor of the exchequer and Unionist MP for Glasgow Hillhead, 
told the House ‘there should be concentrated in Edinburgh—I say boldly “in Edinburgh”—all 
the main work of the Departments which look after the business of Scotland’.108 Horne went 
on to suggest that since a suitable site was available near Calton Hill in Edinburgh the 
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Government should move quickly to provide a building capable of accommodating the staff 
of the various Scottish Office departments. The turnaround on the part of Unionists stemmed 
primarily from a pragmatic realisation that the existing system was no longer fit for purpose. 
A more professionally-minded administration was a crucial step in modernising Scottish 
affairs. Lindsay Paterson has described how, by the late 1930s, ‘the real power in Scottish 
politics came to lie with the Scottish Office bureaucrats’, underlining how the location of a 
professional civil service within Scotland itself improved the quality of administrative 
governance.109 There was also the symbolic effect of returning a degree of power to the 
Scottish capital. John Buchan, the author and Unionist MP for the Scottish Universities, 
welcomed proposals to transfer the Scottish Office to Edinburgh as ‘an outward and visible 
sign of Scotland’s nationhood’.110 Buchan’s language in the King’s Speech debate on 24 
November came close to that of the moderate Home Rulers, arguing that, ‘Scottish 
administration should not be regarded as a backwater’, but rather as a ‘sister nation, with her 
own compact and organic system of government’.111 This was the language of Unionist 
Nationalism and consensus developed between the more progressive Unionists and the 
industrialists. MPs like Walter Elliot, Noel Skelton and Robert Boothby saw merit in greater 
state involvement and recognised the need for a more responsive approach to Scottish 
problems.112 
 
The subtext, of course, was that by influencing the reshaping of the Scottish Office, Scottish 
capital was in effect working to improve the Union. Building a more effective Edinburgh-based 
administration could only help strengthen bodies like the SNDC or the SEC. Nevertheless, 
there remained a deep unease about nationalism. The Glasgow writer William Power, one of 
many to claim credit for the original idea of the SNDC, complained about the organisation’s 
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rebirth as the Scottish Development Council in 1936, noting that ‘the Council has now 
dropped the word ‘National’, of which businessmen in Scotland are queerly afraid’.113 Yet the 
establishment of the modern Scottish Office owed much to the interventions of the business 
community in 1932. Unionist Nationalism had moved far from its civic origins and was now 
defined by concern for the economic wellbeing of Scotland. The magnitude of the inter-war 
crisis demanded bold thinking, and although their solutions ultimately fell short, Scotland’s 
business elite had engaged with the future direction of the country in a manner which 
demonstrated, at the very least, an understanding that the status quo was no longer tenable. 
 
**** 
 
By the end of the 1930s, Scotland’s industrialists had embraced significant change. It might 
not have been their preferred option, but they made a pragmatic accommodation with 
greater state involvement. Echoing the work of Graeme Morton, new bodies like the SNDC 
and SEC had their roots in an associational culture which stretched back to the nineteenth 
century, but they also reached out to a much broader constituency across Scottish society. 
Economic planning and state intervention were a reaction to the extended depression, but 
the fundamental recalibration of the Scottish economy was conceived as a process of self-
help. For the generation of West of Scotland industrialists who entered business at the turn 
of the century, the deep-seated economic problems which were revealed after the Great War 
could only be addressed within the Union. The solutions, however, would be Scottish ones, 
conceived and carried out in Scotland. The energy expended by Scotland’s industrialists, and 
the underlying urgency in their actions, rebuts the suggestion of ‘banal unionism’. 
Rationalisation was a response to a more threatening global environment, but it also 
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preserved the strongest elements of Scottish industry. The stress on diversification 
recognised that the staple trades would never regain past glories and attempted to shift the 
balance towards the new industries of the future. By fostering a sense of renewal, economic 
revival became part of a wider narrative that sought to counter socialism or Nationalism. 
Inter-war economic Unionist Nationalism may have had a defensive element to it, but by the 
end of the 1930s, the acceptance of corporatist economic planning, combined with the 
enhanced status of the Scottish Office had set the course for the future. 
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